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Abstract
Variola (smallpox) virus is classified as class A of potential biological weapons, due to 
its microbiological, genetic, antigenic and epidemiological characteristics. The poten-
tial danger is more real because vaccination against smallpox has stopped since disease 
eradication in 1979. That is why we want to share our unique, rich experience and ac-
quired knowledge in the fight against this highly contagious and deadly disease during 
the smallpox outbreak in ex-Yugoslavia in 1972. It was the largest postwar outbreak 
in Europe when there were officially registered 175 ill patients, 35 of them with lethal 
outcome. This outbreak was specific by the time of its occurrence, the affected territory, 
dimensions and some epidemiological characteristics, but also by the well-organized, 
synchronized and efficient reaction of the competent state services in the fight against it. 
SMALLPOX AS A HISTORICAL HEALTH 
THREAT
Variola is considered one of the most deadly diseases 
in human history that decimated the population and 
significantly changed the course of civilization develop-
ment. The origin of smallpox is unknown. It is believed 
that it first appeared about 10 000 BC in northeast Afri-
ca, from where it spread to the Far East, up to India and 
China. The oldest credible confirmation of the smallpox 
presence in Africa was found in 1500 BC in Sanskrit 
writings about the deity-protectors of smallpox, while 
on the mummy of Egyptian ruler Ramses V (1100 BC) 
were observed lesions that indicated that he died of 
smallpox [1, 2].
Hippocrates (460-370 BC) did not mention this dis-
ease, while Galen described it in the 2nd century [3]. In 
the 6th century the epidemic in Mecca was mentioned. 
It is believed that the virus was introduced into Europe 
in the period between the 5th and 7th century, during 
the invasion of the Saracens from North Africa, across 
the Pyrenees, but variola might have arrived in Europe 
through natural ways of communication from Asia Mi-
nor. It caused frequent outbreaks during the Middle 
Ages and the New Age, when smallpox was the most 
deadly disease in Europe causing the death of about 
400 000 Europeans annually, including 5 rulers [1]. In 
the 15th century Spanish conquerors brought a smallpox 
virus to the territory of Cuba and Mexico, where in the 
first outbreak wave the entire tribes of native inhabit-
ants perished. At the time when the European coloniz-
ers conquered the New World, smallpox was used as a 
strong biological weapon against powerful empires of 
the Aztecs and the Incas, and many Indian tribes [4]. In 
Australia the variola appeared in the 19th century, when 
the epidemic broke out in Sydney [3].
During the 20th century a smallpox virus caused 300-
500 million deaths in the world. In the period between 
1950 and 1971, smallpox found its way into Belgium, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, French, East and 
West Germany, Spanish, England, Italy, Holland, Po-
land, Switzerland, Sweden and the USSR, mostly via 
travelers from endemic foci causing many outbreaks. In 
each of the mentioned epidemics the number of regis-
tered cases was under one hundred [5]. 
This is why, in 1967, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) launched a global campaign for the disease 
eradication, when the vaccination against smallpox in-
cluded all current and potential foci [6]. The campaign 
was successfully completed in 1979, and on the 8 May, 
1980, WHO proclaimed the eradication of smallpox. 
It was recommended that only two laboratories in the 
world (in Russia-the former Soviet Union and the Unit-
ed States) retain the virus, while others were obliged to 
destroy it. The time of its destruction in these laborato-
Address for correspondence: Elizabeta Ristanovic, Department of Microbial Genetics and Immunology, Institute of Microbiology, Military Medical 
Academy, 17 Crnotravska St., Belgrade, Serbia. E-mail: elizabeta.ristanovic@vma.mod.gov.rs.
























ries was not definitely determined. After eradication, the 
mass vaccination against smallpox was terminated [7].
BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
AND TODAY’S CHALLENGE
Variola virus is classified as the genus Orthopoxvirus, 
family Poxviridae, together with some animal poxviruses 
such as vaccinia virus, monkeypox, camelpox, mouse-
pox, rabbitpox, and others [8]. The origin of variola vi-
rus is unknown and there is no evidence that the nature 
of smallpox during the centuries has undergone some 
changes [9]. In the 20th century, numerous researchers 
investigated correlation among smallpox and another 
animal poxviruses with the aim of explaining its origin 
and thus finding the most biological, immunological 
and epidemiological similarity between smallpox and 
monkeypox which can induce illness in humans, and 
be transmitted from human to human. It was also very 
hard to confirm differences of smallpox and camelpox-
“white poxvirus” [10-17]. During smallpox epidemic 
in 1975 Lourie et al. from trapped rodents-Gerbil in 
North Africa isolated pox virus that was biologically 
more similar to variola minor (alastrim) than variola 
major [18]. According to these findings there is pos-
sibility that monkeys or rodents could be natural reser-
voirs of the smallpox virus in Equatorial Africa, or they 
could also be infected from some unknown reservoirs in 
wilderness [19] The infected persons are usually virus 
reservoirs during the disease outbreaks. 
Until the discovery of Marburg and Ebola viruses it 
has been described as the biggest human virus, whose 
size is 150-360 nm. It is surrounded with a symmetrical 
capsid envelope with lipoproteins and hemagglutinins 
and contains a double-stranded DNA with 200 000 
base pairs. Smallpox is spread by direct contact with 
an infected person, as well as through air-droplets and 
aerosols. The virus is relatively stable in the environ-
ment, so that in the form of an aerosol it preserves the 
infectivity even for several hours. The disease can be 
transmitted via contaminated clothes and some other 
items, when the risk of infection is less [20]. The in-
cubation period usually lasts 7-17 days, after which 
flu-like symptoms appear: fever, malaise, headache, 
prostration, back pain, and sometimes abdominal pain 
and vomiting. The characteristic rash appears after 2-3 
days, first on the face, hands, forearms, and later on 
the body. Lesions occur on the mucous membranes of 
the nose and mouth quickly transforming into ulcers, 
then progressing from the macula into the papules, pus-
tules and vesicles finally appearing in the form of the 
crusts that fall off, leaving typical scars. There are two 
basic clinical forms of the disease: variola major, which 
has a more difficult clinical course and mortality up to 
30% and variola minor (alastrim), which has a milder 
clinical course and mortality of less than 1% [21]. The 
hardest forms of the disease are hemorrhagic and ma-
lignant (flat) variola, characterized by severe toxemia 
with flat confluent lesions and high mortality rate up to 
96-100%, after 5-6 days. The infected persons are most 
contagious during the temperature rise and in the first 
week of rashes, when the virus is released via the respi-
ratory tract. Contact with the sick in the later stages of 
the disease rarely leads to infection.
Microbial diagnostics of smallpox includes a direct 
electron microscopy of all stages of skin lesions samples 
as well as virus isolation, using in vivio (chicken embryo) 
and in vitro (cell culture) systems. Detections of anti-
gens and antibodies in the patient blood are also very 
useful methods to confirm infection. The methods of 
molecular genetics such as PCR, which can rapidly and 
reliably detect the virus particles are certainly of the 
greatest significance nowadays. Laboratory work with 
infectious material, containing smallpox virus, should 
be conducted using the highest level of biological safety 
containments (BSL4) [20].
The treatment of a smallpox patient is conducted by 
symptomatic therapy while the vaccine can be used in 
the post-exposure prophylaxis in 4 days after exposure 
for obtaining protective immunity, preventing infection 
and alleviating the symptoms of the disease. Specific 
monoclonal antibodies can be used for treatment of im-
munocompromised persons. It is also worth mentioning 
that the smallpox vaccine was the first vaccine in history 
made by Edward Jenner in 1796 [22]. The first Law on 
vaccination against smallpox was adopted in 1874 in 
Germany. The vaccination in Serbia began in 1881 with 
the imported vaccines while since 1901 home-made 
vaccines produced at the Pasteur Institute in Nis, Ser-
bia were used [23]. After first vaccination, the protec-
tion level is high in the first five years, after revaccina-
tion it is maintained longer, while it lasts about 30 years 
after the 3rd dose. The vaccine against smallpox causes 
a large number of adverse effects, especially in infants 
and people with immunodeficiency and in persons with 
chronic diseases.
Due to its microbiological, epidemiological and 
clinical characteristics, then the possibility of the virus 
spreading with aerosol and among people, the smallpox 
virus is classified by the CDC in class A of potential 
biological agents. According to available data, this vi-
rus entered the arsenals of biological weapons of the 
most powerful countries in the world during the Cold 
War and was the subject of serious research, includ-
ing its recombination with Ebola virus [24]. The virus 
is well-studied at the molecular level and it can easily 
be genetically modified in order to prevent the effects 
of the vaccine or to increase the virulence. The virus 
as the biological weapon can be easily cultivated and 
it is possible to produce large quantities in a relatively 
short period. It is very resistant to the environmental 
agents and can survive their impacts for months and 
years [25]. The use of smallpox as a biological agent is 
also supported by the fact that a large portion of the 
world population is vulnerable, susceptible to this virus, 
since the vaccination was terminated after its eradica-
tion, mortality is high, and there is no specific therapy 
[26]. The real fear of the application of smallpox virus 
as a potential biological agent is also supported by the 
fact that in the last years of the 20th century in some 
countries in the world began the intensive production 
of vaccine against smallpox. Considering that this is a 
highly contagious agent where one infected person can 
transmit the infection to 10 or 20 others, special pro-
tection measures are required in the management of 
























patients (room-isolators with negative air pressure and 
accompanying protective equipment that prevents the 
infection spreading) as well as during microbiological 
processing of the samples (BSL 4 laboratories) so that 
its breakout might lead to big problems in health care 
activities, as well as in all other public services, espe-
cially in undeveloped countries [25, 27].
In today’s world of global contradictions, the use of 
biological weapons, including smallpox, poses a real 
danger, both in war and in bioterrorist actions when the 
agent has been acquired by individuals or groups with 
nefarious intentions over which no one has any control. 
This danger has particularly come to the fore after 11th 
September, 2001, and the attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York-USA and a subsequent anthrax 
campaign leaving in its wake 11 victims. In this con-
text, the smallpox virus could again become an obvious 
present-day danger. In view of all the above-mentioned, 
it is extremely important to strengthen the awareness 
of this problem, monitor the epidemiological situation 
and take preventive measures, and, above all, to have 
adequately prepared human and material resources 
for the response in case of disease occurrence. In that 
regard the unique experience and lessons of the previ-
ous epidemics and responses of the relevant services in 
these situations are extremely valuable.
An outbreak of smallpox that engulfed the former Yu-
goslavia in 1972 was combated quickly and efficiently. 
The circumstances under which the outbreak started, 
the number of cases reached before smallpox was iden-
tified, the economic damage it caused, as well as the 
taken measures need to be analyzed carefully. 
VARIOLA IN YUGOSLAVIA IN 1972: 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DATA  
AND ANTI-OUTBREAK MEASURES
The outbreak of smallpox in Yugoslavia broke out 
just in a period of intense campaign for disease eradica-
tion. It was the largest post-war outbreak in Europe. 
Both then and now, there were doubts and speculations 
that it might have been a bioterrorist attack on Tito’s 
Yugoslavia as well as many other interpretations [28], 
although scientific facts do not support these claims. 
The beginning of outbreak was registered on Febru-
ary 16th, and the last case was reported on April 11th, 
1972. The outbreak affected a total of 175 persons, 35 
of whom (20%) died. Among the patients there were 99 
(56.6%) men and 76 (43.4%) women. The 174 patients 
were registered in the Republic of Serbia (Central Ser-
bia: 49 cases, 8 of them with lethal outcome; Autono-
mous Province of Kosovo: 124 ill persons, 26 of them 
died; the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina: 1 person 
was infected and died), while one case was recorded in 
the Republic of Montenegro [29]. Spreading of disease 
across the country is shown in Figure 1.
Epidemiological data and serological tests showed 
that a pilgrim Ibrahim H. from the village of Danjane 
(Orahovac near Djakovica) brought the smallpox into 
Yugoslavia. He visited Mecca and Medina (Saudi Ara-
bia) with another 24 pilgrims from Kosovo and returned 
by bus across Iraq, visiting dervish shrines around Basra 
and Baghdad where at that time there were more pa-
tients suffering from smallpox [30]. Upon returning 
to the village, the pilgrim Ibrahim H., according to his 
own testimony, had some mild symptoms of fatigue and 
Figure 1
Smallpox in Yugoslavia. Spreading of disease from primary focal point in Kosovo.
























chills, and several small pimples on the face that also 
confirmed the barber who would not do Ibrahim’s face 
treatment. However, a month later, on his face and body 
were not found any scars, and no traces of vaccination, 
although it was carried out in December 1971 in the 
Institute for Health Protection in Skopje (Macedonia), 
before traveling to Holy places. Following law, all hajj 
participants were previously vaccinated against small-
pox by lyophilized vaccine produced in the Institute 
of Immunology in Zagreb (Croatia), as well as against 
cholera. After vaccination, all of them received certifi-
cates, under the provisions of the WHO International 
Health Regulations, but the success of vaccination was 
not controlled. By testing the sera of passengers who 
travelled on the pilgrimage by bus in which was the first 
infected person, it was found that 20 of them had no 
satisfactory vaccination antibody titer, which opened up 
a number of issues related to the failures in the imple-
mentation of measures of immunization against small-
pox [2, 30]. 
According to the WHO estimates, in Yugoslavia the 
measures of control of all the passengers coming from 
infected areas were implemented and pilgrims were 
treated as a particularly risky group. So it was required 
that a pilgrimage be organized by plane, with pre-sanita-
tion and checking, health control during the trip, as well 
as health surveillance after return. All those recommen-
dations were generally enforced, in agreement with the 
Islamic community, but nevertheless there were some 
private arrangements, such as the one with the person 
who travelled on pilgrimage by bus and subsequently 
brought in the disease [31]. Otherwise, in the WHO’s 
report Iraq first appeared as the smallpox infected area 
in March of 1972. All pilgrims stated that during the 
trip they were healthy. They were revaccinated during 
the outbreak. Serological examination of their samples 
was performed before revaccination at the Institute of 
Virology, vaccine and sera in Belgrade, the national ref-
erence laboratory for smallpox in Yugoslavia, as well as 
in the laboratories of the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta (USA). The results 
showed significant differences of positive findings in 
the sera of Ibrahim H. compared with sera of other 
pilgrims. Therefore, it was considered that Ibrahim H. 
as an index case was a probable source of infection for 
next 9 cases [2, 30]. The scheme of infection origin and 
further spreading is shown in Figure 2. 
The outbreak in the Province of Kosovo developed 
into three generations: 9 cases in the first, 100 in the 
second, and 14 cases in the third, plus the index case. 
The number of secondary infections from one source 
was closely connected with the length and intimacy of 
contact between patients and vulnerable people, and 
depended on the clinical form and stage of the disease at 
a time when the contact was established. Patient Ljatif 
M, one of 9 contacts with index case developed severe 
atypical changes in the skin and mucous membranes 
and caused the largest number of secondary infections. 
He had hemorrhagic and always deadly but unrecogniz-
able form of smallpox. Diagnosis was established post 
mortem on the basis of virologically confirmed smallpox 
infection in numerous contacts, the number of plate-
lets and reduced amount of blood coagulation factors. 
Since he was found to be severely allergic to penicil-
lin, the patient was introduced before his death to the 
groups of students and also stayed in several medical 
institutions. Thus, 38 persons were infected in direct 
contact with him which represents the largest number 
of infections from one person as reported in the world 
literature [32].
Figure 2
The origin and spread of smallpox epidemic. Source: Dovijanić P, et al. Social-medical character of combating against smallpox out-
break in Belgrade. Proceedings of the Symposium Smallpox Outbreak in Belgrade. 1972. p. 15. [In Serbian]
























Out of 175 patients, 105 of them (60%) were previ-
ously vaccinated, 66 (37.7%) were unvaccinated, while 
in 4 of them (2.3%) the vaccination status was unknown 
as it is shown in the Table 1. It is necessary to emphasize 
the big difference in the fatality rate among previously 
vaccinated (8%) and unvaccinated persons (35%). Oth-
erwise the compulsory vaccination of children in Yugo-
slavia was carried out at the age of 6 months to 3 years 
(primary vaccination), with mandatory revaccination at 
7 and 14 years. The control of vaccination success in 
some areas was not adequate, so the significant decline 
of vaccine immunity after primary vaccination and the 
lack of revaccination led to disease occurrence in the 
young population [33].
One of the specificities of this outbreak was a rela-
tively high percentage of hemorrhagic forms of dis-
eases as it is shown in Table 2. Early and late hemor-
rhagic forms appeared in 8.0% of registered smallpox 
cases with severe pain, bleeding and temperature. All 
patients died in the first week of illness. This form of 
disease appeared in both vaccinated and unvaccinated 
persons. The standard anti-shock therapy did not give 
positive results, due to continuing increase in viral load 
and new tissue damage [34]. In the sample of a nurse 
from Belgrade, with this form of smallpox, just before 
death, were registered 21 750 viral particles in 1 ml of 
blood [2]. The other authors previously published simi-
lar results but the number of virus particles was never 
at any time over 10 000 particles in 1 ml of blood [1, 
35, 36]. Malignant (flat) form appeared in 19 cases, 
including 7 under one year of age. Only one person 
among them, a pregnant woman, had a vaccination scar 
[37]. Three patients with this smallpox form received 
a transfusion of fresh blood of vaccinated people and 
convalescents, which had favorable therapeutic effects, 
and represented a significant contribution to the prac-
tice of treating the disease [38]. Ordinary forms of dis-
ease were registered in 72 cases. The prognosis in this 
form was relatively good. Death outcome occurred in 
the elderly, immunocompromised, and those with im-
pairments of other organs. In the four of seven deaths, 
the immunization scarring was not detected. Modified 
smallpox form was detected in 67 patients, without a 
single fatality. Most of them, 61, were with the old vac-
cine scars. This form did not represent a problem in 
therapy, but it was a diagnostic challenge because the 
rash drying happened in the stage of papules or vesicles, 
while pustulisation was rare and did not affect any efflo-
rescence. Due to the scarcity of material the cultivation 
of the virus became more difficult, while the serologi-
cal diagnosis was the only available option, although in 
most patients antibody titers were low. These forms had 
a good prognosis and required only symptomatic treat-
ment [39]. Variola sine exanthemata was identified in 
3 cases on the basis of clinical and serological criteria 
[40]. It is assumed that there were more patients with 
subclinical forms of disease, but serological tests were 
not performed. Eight of 14 affected infants died. The 
affected children were mostly from Kosovo, they were 
not vaccinated, but the vaccination status of mothers 
affected the occurrence of the disease, its manifestation 
and prognosis [41].
Different clinical manifestations of smallpox in Yugo-
slavia are shown in Figure 3. The previous state, genetic 
predispositions, immune and vaccination status had a 
major impact on clinical picture of patients. Three of 6 
patients with previous hepatitis infection died, as well 
as two patients with pertussis, and the patient with tu-
berculous meningitis. The previous vaccinations had the 
biggest impact on the clinical manifestations of disease. 
Ordinary forms occurred more frequently in unvacci-
nated people, as well as the flat forms, while the modi-
Table 1
Vaccinal status and age distribution of diseased and deceased persons in the smallpox outbreak
Age groups
0 1-6 7-14 15-19 ≥ 20 TOTAL
Diseased persons
Vaccinated 1 6 7 91 105
Not vaccinated 12 14 13 6 21 66
Unknown 4 4
Total number of diseased persons 12 15 19 13 116 175
Fatal cases
Vaccinated 1 1 6 8
Not vaccinated 8 3 3 2 7 23
Unknown 4 4
Total number of fatal cases 8 3 4 3 17 35
Lethality (%) 66.7 20 21 23 15 20
Table 2
Diseased and deceased from various clinical forms of smallpox 
during Yugoslav outbreak in 1972
Clinical form Number  
and percent  
of diseased
Number  
and percent  
of fatal cases
Early hemorhagic 13 (7.4%) 13 (100%)
Late hemorhagic 1 (0.6%) 1 (100%)
Flat (variola maligna) 19 (10.8%) 14 (73.7%)
Ordinary 72 (31.2%) 7 (9.7%)
Modified 67 (38.3%) 0 (0%)
Variola sine exanthemate 3 (1.7%) 0 (0%)
























fied forms and variola sine exanthema appeared only in 
people with vaccine scars. Lethality was also three times 
higher in people without immunization scars [42].
During Yugoslav smallpox outbreak, microbiological 
diagnosis was performed in the National reference lab-
oratory for smallpox in the Institute of Virology vaccine 
and sera in Belgrade using electron microscopy (EM) − 
method of negative staining, poxvirus antigen detection 
by immunodiffusion precipitation method in agarose 
gel (AGID), virus isolation on chorion-allantoic mem-
brane (CAM) of chicken embryos and serologic assays 
of hemagglutination inhibition (IHA), complement 
fixation (CF) and neutralization test (NT). The same 
choice of diagnostic procedures at that time was carried 
out by the laboratories for smallpox of CDC Atlanta, 
which had a long experience in combating and eradica-
tion of smallpox in West Africa and Brazil [43, 44].
Skin lesions of 93 patients suspected of smallpox 
were tested. Virus isolation on CAM chicken embryo 
gave a high percentage of positive results (over 90%) as 
well as the data about the nature of pox virus isolates 
(variola or vaccinia). This method was very suitable for 
the isolation of the virus from the blood in the early 
days of the disease and especially valuable in fulminant 
hemorrhagic form, when the patient did not have sig-
nificant skin lesions or death occurred quickly. The dis-
advantage of the method was the long duration of the 
process (48 to 72 hours). The method of EM with nega-
tive staining proved to be a fast, highly sensitive and 
accurate method, but it did not distinguish variola virus 
from other poxviruses, particularly a vaccinia virus that 
was used as vaccine in mass. AGID method for detec-
tion smallpox infection was also a very fast method, but 
gave the lowest percentage of positive results (below 
60%) and required a greater amount of material. There-
fore, the combination of EM and isolation in chicken 
embryo CAM gave the best result in the virology diag-
nostics [44]. Serological methods are used for examina-
tion of 410 blood samples taken from 124 patients. It 
was found that the significant antibody titers (1:80 and 
1: 160) were registered on the fourth day of the disease, 
depending on the used methods, while the highest an-
tibody levels were recorded between the third and sev-
enth week of the onset of the disease, which was consis-
tent with results of other authors. The combination of 
the listed diagnostic methods provided an opportunity 
for retrograde diagnosis of smallpox, which was par-
ticularly important for finding sources of infection and 
detection of subclinical infections. According to these 
criteria it was determined that a pilgrim, Ibrahim H., 
was the index case in the Yugoslav outbreak. In addition 
to the high positive findings in the IHA, CF and NT, his 
serum samples taken on March 16, 1972, were positive 
in agar-gel precipitation with vaccinia and variola anti-
gen. The serum was positive in NT even in the dilution 
1: 4.096 that was not registered in any other sera of 
pilgrims. The obtained results with applied AGID test 
using variola antigen were different from all published 
data so far. Precipitins antibodies in our patients were 
found from the first day of illness up to 4 months. It 
was also observed that patients with low values of vi-
rus neutralizing antibodies, and with the high values of 
IHA, CF and AGID antibodies died of smallpox. Previ-
ous vaccination status had a visual impact on the time 
of occurrence, as well as the value of antibodies that 
inhibit haemagglutination, which fix complement and 
antibodies that neutralize the virus, but had no tangible 
impact on results in the AGID reaction. Serology tests 
had important role in discovering of unapparent infec-
tions, atypical smallpox cases and discovering source of 
infection [2].
About 52% or 91 people were infected outside the 
hospital, while 84 patients or 48% were infected in hos-
pitals. The exception to this percentage represents the 
focal point in the province of Kosovo, where the outpa-
tient cases were twice as frequent. Otherwise, a com-
mon feature of postwar smallpox outbreaks in Europe 
was that most of the patients were infected in hospitals 
(index 2.4:1.6), while in the Yugoslav outbreak the situ-
ation was reverse (ratio 1.1: 2.0) [45]. Another specific 
feature of the outbreak in the primary focus referred 
to the fact that the focus of nosocomial infections in 
this area, in addition to infective was a maternity ward, 
although the exact way how virus entered the maternity 
hospitals was not determined. The characteristic of the 
outbreak was the great number of the affected infants, 
14, or 8% of the total number of patients, which was the 
largest number of the diseased children of this age in all 
postwar smallpox outbreaks in Europe [41].
Vaccination in the first foci started already on 16th 
Figure 3
Different clinical manifestations of smallpox in Yugoslavia A: early hemorhagic variola with purpuric skin changes; B: ordinary form: 
variola pustulosa confluens, 9th day of the illness; C: intrahospital infection; 4-months old baby died on the 14th day of the illness. 
(Photo: V. Šuvaković, M.Kecmanović; source: Variola in Yugoslavia in 1972. Proceedings of the Yugoslav Symposium on Smallpox, 
Primošten: 1972. [In Serbo-Croatian])
























March, one day after virology confirmation of smallpox 
diagnosis. By the decision of the competent authority, 
the Federal Epidemiologic Commission, vaccination 
was later extended to the entire population of Yugo-
slavia, so that the measure covered a total of 18 mil-
lion people. Among vaccinated, were many pregnant 
women. In 180 of them, the blood samples were taken 
from mothers and from umbilical cord of their new-
borns, for detecting of IHA antibodies. In 95 of tested 
pair sera higher values of vaccinia antibodies (from 
2-16 times) were confirmed in new born children than 
in mothers’ sera. The concentrations of IgA and IgM 
immunoglobulins were higher in sera of mothers, while 
IgG concentrations were higher in sera of newborns. 
The isolation of vaccinia virus was tried from fetal tis-
sue of vaccinated mothers after abortion, but it was not 
successful. Herpes virus was isolated from one tissue 
sample. Among vaccinated women, we found the data 
related to about 110 women vaccinated within first 3 
months of pregnancy and 300 women vaccinated after 
3 months. As most women from the first group had an 
abortion, the destiny of newborns from 247 vaccinated 
mothers was monitored. All children were healthy and 
had normal constitution that is particularly important 
[46-48].
The treatment by Marboran and vaccinia gamma 
globulin, hyperimmune anti-variola serum was also 
conducted during the outbreak [49]. All health institu-
tions in the country undertook adequate measures to 
combat smallpox and stop bad effects of vaccination on 
the entire population. Health surveillance of hot spots 
in the province of Kosovo included the daily tour of the 
population, temperature taking and checking of the 
skin and the oral mucosa. In the search for contacts, 
nearly 3000 surveys were carried out in Belgrade [50]. 
Contacts were taken care of in special quarantine in-
stitutions, but there were also quarantined individual 
households and whole villages. Restrictions on popula-
tion movements from infected areas, the control of vac-
cination success and prohibition of public gatherings 
were widely applied measures. As the primary immuni-
zation after contact was the main protective measure, 
many people who subsequently came in contact with 
smallpox patients did not get the disease. Yet primary 
immunization after contact in the Yugoslav outbreak 
had no greater impact in terms of reporting milder 
clinical forms of the disease, which was contrary to the 
then available literature data on the existence of clinical 
modifications after the primary vaccination in the first 
six days after risk contact [51]. But the persons with old 
scars in most cases had a clearly modified clinical pic-
ture, regardless of whether a booster shot after contact 
was successful or not [52].
ORGANIZATION OF THE YUGOSLAV HEALTH 
SERVICE AND THE WHOLE SOCIETY IN THE 
FIGHT AGAINST SMALLPOX
The health service in Yugoslavia was seriously pre-
pared for the case of importing smallpox virus within an 
organization fighting quarantine diseases. The National 
Reference Laboratory for smallpox was founded in 1966 
at the Institute of Virology, Vaccine and Sera “Torlak” 
in Belgrade, Serbia. Already in 1967 in the laboratory 
was isolated and studied the Marburg virus imported 
with shipment of 300 monkeys from Africa [53]. The 
adequate equipment including electron microscope was 
procured. Diagnostic procedures were also being test-
ed. The laboratory team consisted of two experts and 
one medical technician responsible for virology work 
and two experts for electron microscopy. Previously, the 
experts for training visited the laboratories that were in-
volved in the diagnosis of this disease in England and 
West Germany. The laboratory did not have a separate 
building. It was located in the same place as a laboratory 
for arboviruses and hemorrhagic fevers at the building 
for the entire virology, including the production of viral 
vaccines. The entire staff of virology sector was vacci-
nated against smallpox. Once or twice a year the labora-
tory tested the working methodology, restored positive 
sera and control antigens and several times intervened 
in cases of suspicion of smallpox being imported: an ill 
sailor stranded in Split (Croatia) with suspicious erup-
tive skin changes, then a suspicious ill passenger from 
the train from Ljubljana (Slovenia) to Belgrade (Serbia) 
and a sick female coming from the area where variola 
was registered. In all three cases the results on smallpox 
were negative [2].
The first smallpox case in our country in 1972 was 
atypical; in addition, the majority of doctors had no 
practical experience in the diagnosis of this disease, 
since last smallpox case in Yugoslavia was registered in 
1930. At the beginning, it was thought that the out-
break would have a local character, although the pos-
sibility of its spreading was not neglected, so the taken 
measures were adequate to the situation. The contami-
nated areas were identified, and movement of people 
there was prohibited. The plan of detection and isola-
tion of patients, as well as isolation of persons from con-
tacts was also established, in accordance with the inter-
national sanitary regulations and practices. The plan of 
progressive vaccination of the entire population of the 
Autonomy Province of Kosovo was also in line with the 
potential spread of infection. Throughout the Republic 
of Serbia and other republics of the Former Yugoslavia 
at the same time began vaccination of all workers in 
the medical sector, transport, catering industry, internal 
affairs, and a wider range of the population, according 
to the epidemiological indications. A plan of taking and 
sending samples for laboratory testing was made ac-
cording to the possibilities of a competent laboratory 
in Belgrade [54].
A state of emergency and the regime of 24 hours 
duty had been introduced in the laboratory. The staff 
was vaccinated again and a greater amount of equip-
ment for sample taking was acquired. During labora-
tory processing of samples, a special regime of per-
sonal and collective protection in the laboratory was 
organized (suits, gowns, masks, goggles, gloves, boots, 
bathing after work, permanent sterilization of working 
rooms, strictly controlled transport and sterilization or 
incineration of all infectious items and materials as well 
as ceasing the contact of laboratory personnel with the 
external environment). In this regard it is important to 
mention that in the course of investigating and isolat-
























ing smallpox and during prior experience with Marburg 
virus in the laboratory there were no cases of laboratory 
infections. This fact indicates the good training and or-
ganization of work since then the biosafety standards as 
we know them today were not in force [55].
Patient samples were taken by a well-trained team 
that consisted of three experienced microbiologists 
and epidemiologists who brought the samples to the 
laboratory in specially prepared sets which contained 
a list with a pen for a patient’s data, a plastic syringe 
and blood tube, equipment for skin lesions sampling 
(scalpel, lancet, tweezers, scissors), capillary tube for 
taking fluid from the vesicles and pustules, small bottles 
for crust and slides for smear. The taken samples were 
packed into impervious plastic bags and transported to 
the laboratory by appropriate transport means (heli-
copter, plane, car) provided by the republic or federal 
civil protection staff. During sample collection, the 
staff wore appropriate suits for personal and collective 
protection. Such procedure of professional sampling 
and safe transport was important for the reliability of 
laboratory tests and presented an adequate biosecurity 
precaution. In cases of suspected smallpox, on the ba-
sis of clinical and epidemiological parameters, a nega-
tive answer obtained by one test did not exclude the 
diagnosis, so it was necessary to wait for the results of 
virus isolation (3 days), or sub-passaging (3-6 days). 
The whole working process was documented in details. 
The efficiency and results of the laboratory were highly 
rated by the WHO [55].
On the basis of acquired experience during the out-
break, it was clear that a specially equipped laboratory 
center for working with dangerous pathogens was nec-
essary and that it should be located within a separate 
building providing adequate conditions for sterilization 
of the stale air and wastewater as well as the conditions 
that would provide safety and security of laboratory 
workers and the environment. The quarantine hospitals 
or isolation units were required to be preferably placed 
within these laboratory buildings in terms of major out-
breaks. The learned lesson related to the fact that it was 
necessary to have a larger number of laboratory workers 
acquainted with working procedures. Providing perma-
nent professional training abroad and adequate funding 
to maintain the readiness of laboratories and scientific 
research in this area were supposed to be a priority in 
the planning allocations [54, 56]. These requirements 
do not lose its relevance even nowadays, when the con-
ditions for working with dangerous pathogens such as 
smallpox, are precisely defined. 
The isolation of patients during the outbreak was 
carried out in accordance with the principle of accom-
modation in special conditions (isolation in hospitals, 
hotels, motels, spas) in situations where there were no 
special facilities for the medical treatment of quaran-
tine diseases. Accommodation of persons who were in 
contact with diseased patients was also performed ac-
cording to local conditions. Federal headquarters for 
the fight against smallpox brought a precise decision on 
the infected areas and the measures which had to be 
implemented, on the movement of people, traffic etc. 
Requirements for a sanitary blockade of the whole re-
gion of Province Kosovo were without any professional 
justification, because since the outbreak was confirmed 
there was no single case of transmission of disease from 
its territory [57].
Requirements for vaccination of the entire Yugoslav 
population at that time were not realistic because the 
infected areas had priority and the amount of vaccines 
was inadequate. However, the emergence of disease out 
of affected areas in other cities of Serbia (Novi Sad, Ca-
cak, Belgrade, Sid) and Montenegro, which occurred 
due to contacts with infected persons in the province 
before the official start of the outbreak as it is shown 
in Figure 1, gave basis for the decision of the Federal 
Executive Council of Yugoslavia to start gradual vac-
cination of the entire population and to take adequate 
measures for importing of vaccines and hyperimmune 
gamma-globulin [52]. 
The public was being informed all the time by the 
competent professionals about the occurrence and 
spreading of the disease and the measures that should 
be taken from the first days of the outbreak. Daily 
newspapers continuously published the adequate bul-
letins. The WHO was informed about all facts and its 
experts were invited in order to coordinate informing of 
the world public [58]. 
The work and coordination of all management bodies 
and state administrative bodies responsible for health 
affairs were at a high level. The Federal Executive 
Council followed the work and gave full support to the 
Federal Headquarters for the fight against smallpox, 
whose task was to collect and publish data about the 
disease, coordinate the work of national and provin-
cial headquarters, acquire and distribute vaccines and 
other means and to define the other measures based 
on the evaluation of the epidemiological situation. The 
staffs in the republics and provinces were organs of the 
Executive Councils or Municipal Assemblies. Medical 
Service of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) at full ca-
pacity was the integral part of the response of the health 
service and society in general [59, 60].
CONCLUSIONS: VALUBLE AND ACCURATE 
LESSONS LEARNED IN YUGOSLAV 
OUTBREAK
Without neglecting the organizational, technical and 
other weaknesses, and the lack of practical experience, 
we can say that the Yugoslav health service quickly and 
efficiently carried out the task of combating the out-
break, which was large in the number of cases (175) 
and geographical spread (25 foci) and caused a severe 
disruption of life and economy in the country. The re-
markable commitment of health workers and other 
social actors, as well as the disciplined behavior of the 
population certainly significantly contributed to this 
success. The omissions were related to the undetected 
first smallpox case (inadequate medical and sanitary 
control), late detection (only at the beginning of the 
second wave, when there were already 11 patients in 6 
foci) and inadequate implementation of prescribed vac-
cination of certain categories of the population which 
facilitated the outbreak spreading (46% of the cases 
were found among the people which should have been 
























protected in the regular vaccination, and 8% among 
staff of health institutions). The problem was that the 
basic anti-outbreak measure - vaccination in focus was 
not implemented quickly enough, as well as the absence 
of a unique approach about the quarantine, control and 
restriction of people’s movements to and from infected 
areas, as well as within them. 
The recorded lessons are related to the facts that it is 
necessary to strengthen the capacities for rapid labora-
tory diagnosis, provide facilities for isolation and treat-
ment of the patients and develop uniform medical pro-
cedures in order to combat the contagious infectious 
diseases effectively. It is also important to keep enhanc-
ing the capacities of the Institute for Health Protection 
with the training of mobile teams for field work, con-
stant reinforcement of sanitary-epidemiological service 
and the sanitary inspection, with constant monitoring 
of the situation in the world and achievements in the 
field of science. It was emphasized that special point 
should be given to education and training of person-
nel, and health education of the population [61]. Key 
contribution in relatively rapid outbreak suppression 
had the integrated efforts of specially formed bodies 
for fighting smallpox at all levels, good organization of 
health services, support of the Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA), as well as international solidarity and the WHO 
support.
Considering all the above-mentioned, it is clear that 
the variola virus is a dangerous pathogen, which has an 
important place on the list of potential biological agents 
due to its characteristics and possible consequences 
that it might cause. In times of growing threats from 
bioterrorism and possible misuse of science, all com-
petent bodies must pay special attention to the preven-
tion as well as the preparation of resources for medical 
treatment in the event of the occurrence of the disease. 
This include training of the personnel, and improving 
diagnostic capabilities with respect to prescribed bio-
safety standards and other capacities required for medi-
cal care, as well as knowledge of the necessary tools for 
crisis management and crisis communications.
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